Abstract. Ordinarily, RSA and Rabin ciphertexts and signatures are log N bits, where N is a composite modulus; here, we describe how to "compress" Rabin ciphertexts and signatures (among other things) down to about (2/3) log N bits, while maintaining a tight provable reduction from factoring in the random oracle model. The computational overhead of our compression algorithms is small. We also improve upon Coron's results regarding partial-domain-hash signature schemes, reducing by over 300 bits the hash output size necessary to prove adequate security.
Introduction
The hardness of factoring is one of the most fundamental and frequently used assumptions of public-key cryptography; yet cryptosystems that rely on the factoring assumption have relatively poor performance in terms of bandwidth. For example, RSA and Rabin ciphertexts and signatures are typically at least as many bits as the composite modulus N , while recent advances in hardware-based approaches to factoring (e.g., [32] ) suggest that N must be more than 1024 bits for strong security. So, factoring-based cryptosystems often do not compare favorably with cryptosystems based on alternative hard problems -e.g., ECC for encryption or DSA for signatures.
Bandwidth consumption is important, in part because fundamental limitations of wireless technology put bandwidth at a premium. For example, Barr and K. Asanović [2] note that wireless transmission of a single bit can cost more than 1000 times as much energy as a 32-bit computation. Since battery efficiency is growing relatively slowly, energy consumption (particularly through wireless transmission) may become a significant bottleneck.
Moreover, signal interference places physical limits on how much data can be transmitted wirelessly in a given region. This was not a problem in wired networks. These limitations are compounded by the lossiness of wireless channels, which necessitates additional bandwidth in the form of forward error correction (FEC). FEC is particularly important for cryptographic transmissions, where partial recovery of a ciphertext or digital signature is typically useless.
These considerations make compression algorithms very attractive. In fact, in recent years, substantial progress has been made in constructing "compressed" cryptosystems. For example, XTR [22] and CEILIDH [30] both use "compact representations" of certain elements to achieve a bandwidth savings. There are also a variety of hybrid cryptosystems, such as signcryption and aggregate signature schemes, in which multiple cryptographic functionalities are somehow represented by a single, relatively short string. However, although such hybrid cryptosystems exist for RSA and Rabin, none of them breaks the "(log N )-bit barrier."
Our Design Goals. In light of these considerations, we would like to construct a compression algorithm that is broadly applicable to factoring-based schemes, such as RSA and Rabin. Ideally, the compression algorithm should allow RSA and Rabin ciphertexts and signatures to be substantially less than log N bits without sacrificing any security -i.e., while still using (and retaining the security of) a (log N )-bit modulus. Moreover, the compression algorithm should add minimal computational overhead. If the compression algorithm requires additional computation, this computation should not require use of the secret key, so that it can be performed (more quickly) outside of a "secure environment," such as a smart card.
Our Results. We essentially achieve our design goals, except that our techniques work only for Rabin-type cryptosystems, not for RSA. Along the way, we also substantially improve upon Coron's results on partial-domain-hash Rabin signature schemes (Rabin-PDH).
Coron [16] proved the security of a variant of the Rabin signing scheme (Rabin-PDH) in which the hash function that is used to hash the message outputs strings of length ( 2 3 + ) log N bits. It turns out that this has a large effect in practice; if the simulator in the security proof wishes to generate a distribution of signatures whose statistical distance from uniform is less than 2 −80 , Coron's method requires that the hash output length be at least at 2 3 log N +364 bits. We provide a perfectly uniform drawing algorithm that reduces the necessary hash output length to only 2 3 log N + 3 bits; moreover, our security proof is tighter. Our main result, however, is a compression algorithm that allows a 33% reduction in the bit-length of Rabin signatures and ciphertexts, without any sacrifice in security. (Notice that Coron's result is not a compression algorithm; although the hash output length of Coron's Rabin-PDH scheme may be less than log N bits, the Rabin-PDH signature itself, which is essentially a modular square root of the hash output, is a (log N )-bit value.) For our improved version of Rabin-PDH signatures, the "entropy" of the hash output is just over 2 3 log N bits; thus, it is theoretically possible that the signature could also be expressed in about 2 3 log N bits. In fact, up to the loss of a few bits, this is precisely what we achieve: a ( 2 3 log N + 6)-bit Rabin-PDH signature, with a tight reduction from factoring N .
Our lossless compression algorithm also works for Rabin encryption, but in reverse. A ( 2 3 log N )-bit plaintext is "decompressed" by mapping it to a (log N )-bit number that has a ( 2 3 log N + 3)-bit modular square. This modular square is a "compressed" Rabin ciphertext. Numerous other cryptosystems also involve computing square roots modulo a composite modulus N , including Fiat-Shamir, Cocks's identity-based encryption scheme, as well as various schemes enabling ring signatures, signcryption, and so on. Our techniques enable a similar 33% bandwidth reduction for these schemes.
Related Work. Like Coron's work, our techniques build upon Brigitte Vallée's elegant analysis of the distribution, in Z/N Z, of integers in
e., integers with modular squares in a "narrow" interval. We provide a self-contained discussion of her results in section 3.
Some previous work has been done on compressing Rabin and low-exponent RSA signatures -in particular, Bernstein [7] mentions that one can simply remove the 1 e log 2 N least significant bits of any regular Rabin or RSA signature, and the verifier can use Coppersmith's method [17] to recover those bits. Bleichenbacher [8] 2 log 2 N bits, is that they do not allow message recovery; the verifier needs m before verifying, which effectively adds to the signature length. These methods also do not appear to be very broadly applicable; e.g., they do not appear to lead to low-bit-length encryption, signcryption and aggregate signature schemes.
As mentioned above, Coron [16] uses a "compressed" output space for the hash function in a Rabin signature scheme, but the partial-domain hash signatures themselves are still log N bits.
Organization of the Paper. This paper is organized as follows. After noting some preliminaries in Section 2, we describe Vallée's distributional observations and her "quasi-uniform" drawing algorithm in section 3. In section 4, we describe our perfectly uniform drawing algorithm, and our improvement upon Coron's results regarding Rabin-PDH. We describe our compression algorithm in section 5, after which we describe compressed Rabin encryption and signature schemes in section 6. Finally, in Section 7, we mention other cryptosystems -such as signcryption, aggregate signature and ring signature schemes -for which our compression algorithm allows a 33% bandwidth reduction.
Preliminaries
We gather some mathematical notation here for convenience. Let {0, 1}
* denote the set of all bit strings, and let {0, 1} n denote the set of all bit-strings of length n. For a real number r, r denotes the ceiling of r, that is, the smallest integer value greater than or equal to r. Similarly, r denotes the floor of r, that is, the largest integer value less than or equal to r. Finally, r denotes the closest integer to r. Let the symbol denote concatenation.
Throughout, N will denote a suitable integer modulus. To be suitable, N should at least be computationally hard to factor using any modern factoring algorithm. In practice, one often generates N as the product of two large prime numbers p and q -e.g., 512 bits apiece. However, one could choose N differently for our schemes, if desired. For example, setting N = p d q for d > 1 can lead to efficiency advantages, though one should be wary of setting d too large [11] .
Let B N,h,h = {x ∈ [1, N ] : h ≤ x 2 (modN ) < h } for integers h and h and suitable modulus N -i.e., the set of integers with modular squares in [h, h ). Let B be shorthand for B N,h,h when N , h and h are understood.
A "lattice" consists of the set of all vectors that can be generated as integer linear combinations of a set of basis vectors. For example, if (a, b) and (c, d) are two basis vectors in two-dimensional space, the lattice that they generate is the set of vectors
Distribution of Numbers with Small Modular Squares
Developing a compressed representation of numbers in B N,h,h that is efficiently computable and invertible requires an understanding of how numbers in B N,h,h are distributed in [0, N/2). The compression algorithm works, at a high level, by taking this distribution into account.
In [33] , Vallée describes the "global" distribution of B N,h,h in [0, N/2) in terms of its "local" distribution in each of a set of Farey intervals that covers [0, N/2). She then describes each local distribution in terms of points of a lattice that lie in the region between two parabolas. For h − h ≥ 8N 2/3 , the distribution of B N,h,h -elements among the Farey intervals is "quasi-independent," allowing her to construct an algorithm that draws integers from B N,h,h "quasiuniformly." Since Vallée's analysis forms the basis of our compression algorithm, we review it in detail in this section.
Farey Sequences
Some properties of Farey sequences are collected in [20] ; we recall them below. The characteristic property of Farey sequences is expressed in the following theorem [20] :
Another useful theorem concerning Farey sequences is the following:
The latter theorem follows from the fact that (a i + a i+1 )/(b i + b i+1 ), the so- 
Definition 4 (Farey Covering). The Farey covering of order k of the interval [0, N/2) is the set Farey intervals I(a
i , b i ) of order k.
The Connection between Farey Sequences and B's Distribution
Although it is far from obvious, Farey sequences have a close connection with the distribution in Z/N Z of integers in B N,h,h . Vallée observed that the gaps between consecutive integers in B vary widely close to the rationals a i N/2b i of small denominator b i . Close to these rationals, the distribution might be called "clumpy," with large gaps separating sequences of small gaps. However, as one considers wider intervals centered at a i N/2b i , the distribution of B-elements provably "evens out" -i.e., the ratio of the number of B-elements in the interval, versus the number one would expect if the B-elements were distributed uniformly, approaches 1. Roughly speaking, the width of interval needed before the "clumpiness" can be disregarded is inversely proportional to b i . This is one reason why Farey intervals are useful for analyzing B's distribution; the diameter of I(a i , b i ) is also inversely proportional to b i .
Building on the above observations, Vallée ultimately proved that the number of B N,h,h -elements in I(a i , b i ) is essentially proportional to the width of I(a i , b i ) (as one would expect), as long as h − h is large enough. Formally, Vallée proved the following theorem [33] . Vallée defines quasi-independence as follows.
Definition 5 (Quasi-Independence).
A subset X and a covering Y = {Y j } of Z N are quasi-independent if, for all j, the sets X and Y j are (l 1 , l 2 )-independent for some positive constants l 1 and l 2 -i.e., l 1 ≤
Clearly, this definition is meaningless unless l 1 and l 2 are independent of N . Vallée proves that l 1 = 1 5 and l 2 = 4 suffice when −h = h ≥ 4N 2/3 and k = N h . This means that, for these parameters, any given Farey interval has no more than l 2 /l 1 = 20 times the "density" of B N,h,h -elements than any other Farey interval.
Interestingly, Vallée's proof of Theorem 3 is essentially constructive. To analyze the distribution of B N,h,h -elements in the "local" region I(a i , b i ), Vallée associates each B N,h,h -element with a point that is in a particular lattice and that lies in the region between two particular parabolas. She then partitions the lattice into a set of parallel lines. The number of lines may be very large -e.g., superpolynomial in log N . Her distribution analysis then becomes "even more local"; she provides upper and lower bounds on how many associated lattice points can occur on each line (except for at most 6 of the lines, for which she only provides upper bounds). These bounds imply similar bounds on the num- Before discussing these algorithms, we review the details of Vallée's analysis. Set x 0 to be the closest integer to
be the lattice generated by the vectors (1, 2x 0 ) and (0, N ). Then, x = x 0 +u is in B N,h,h precisely when there is a w such that (u, w) ∈ L(x 0 ) and h ≤ x 2 0 +w+u 2 < h . The latter requirement implies that (u, w) is in between the two parabolas defined, in variables u and w , by the formulas
It may seem like a fairly complicated task to approximate how many lattice points in L(x 0 ) are between the two parabolas defined above, 1 but, as Vallée describes, it is possible to find a lattice basis of L(x 0 ) in which the basis vectors are each short, with one basis vector being "quasi-horizontal" and the other being "quasi-vertical." The basis is (r, s) with:
Recall that |u 0 | ≤ 
2 /16b i N , which intersect the region between the two parabolas in an area she dubs the "legs" (which is in between the "chest" and the "feet"), Vallée proves the following theorem: 
Her bounds on each individual line in the legs imply lower and upper bounds on the total number of lattice points in the legs, using the inequalities:
For lines with indices in [0, (v 1 − 1)N/b i + 1 points, and that there are at most 2 lines in the feet, each with fewer than 8 points. Ultimately, Vallée proves Theorem 3 using her lower bounds for the legs, and upper bounds for the chest, legs and feet.
Vallée's Quasi-Uniform Drawing Algorithm
Vallée uses the above results, particularly her lower and upper bounds for the legs, to obtain a concrete algorithm for drawing integers from B N,h,h quasiuniformly when h − h ≥ 8N 2/3 . For a quasi-uniform drawing algorithm, the respective probabilities of any two B N,h,h -elements being drawn are within a constant factor of each other; formally:
Definition 6 (Quasi-Uniform). A drawing algorithm C, defined over a finite set U and with values in a subset X of Z N , is said to be (l 1 , l 2 )-uniform (or quasiuniform) for constants l 1 and
Vallée's algorithm is as follows: I(a i , b i ) ) has a higher chance of being chosen in the first two steps. However, once an interval is chosen, any given B-element in that interval has a lower probability of being chosen if the interval is wide than if it is narrow. On balance, these factors even out (this is quasi-independence), and the drawing algorithm is quasi-uniform.
In computing l 2 /l 1 , there are three things to consider. 
Improving Vallée's and Coron's Results
In this section, we describe how to modify Vallée's quasi-uniform drawing algorithm to make it perfectly uniform. Our perfectly uniform drawing algorithm gives us an immediate improvement upon Coron's proof of security for Rabin-PDH; in particular, it allows us to reduce the output size of the partial domain hash function (see subsection 4.2). More generally, the fact that a simulator can draw B-elements uniformly in responding to an adversary's hash queries allows us (when combined with the compression schemes of Section 5) to reduce the bandwidth of several signature-related cryptosystems, including aggregate signature schemes, ring signature schemes and signcryption schemes.
A Perfectly Uniform Drawing Algorithm
Modifying Vallée's quasi-uniform drawing algorithm to make it perfectly uniform is surprisingly simple. Our modification is based on our observation that, for any B N,h,h -element (with h − h ≥ 8N 2/3 , as required by Vallée), anyone can efficiently compute the exact probability P x that Vallée's quasi-uniform drawing algorithm will output x . For example, a simulator in a security proof can compute this probability (without, of course, needing the factorization of N ).
Assume, for now, that we can efficiently compute P x for any given x . Let P min be a lower bound on such probabilities over all B N,h,h -elements. Then, the improved drawing algorithm is as follows:
Step 1 with probability (P x − P min )/P x . 4. Otherwise, output x . Since Vallée's drawing algorithm is quasi-uniform, the expected number of "Goto" loops per draw is a small constant; thus, the simulator's estimated time-complexity increases only by a constant factor. The probability that x is chosen in Step 1 and that it "survives" Step 3 is the same for all x -namely, P x ·(1− P x −P min P x ) = P min ; for this reason, and since each run of Vallée's algorithm is independent, the algorithm is perfectly uniform. Now, given x , how does one (say, a simulator) compute P x ? First, the simulator determines the at most two Farey intervals I(a i , b i ) and I(a i+1 , b i+1 ) that contain x . For I(a i , b i ) , the simulator computes the index v i of the quasihorizontal line l v i that contains the lattice point (u i , w i ) associated to x , and the exact number n(v i ) of lattice points on l v i . Similarly, if there is a second Farey interval I(a i+1 , b i+1 ) that contains x , the simulator computes v i+1 , l vi+1 , (u i+1 , w i+1 ), and n(v i+1 ). Then, using the variables x and t from Vallée's drawing algorithm, the probability that x will be chosen is:
where we use P r[t i ∈ l vi ] to denote the probability that the choice of t in Step 4 of Vallée's algorithm will map to the line l v i .
Remark 2. So that the above terminology works when (u i , w i ) (or (u i+1 , w i+1 )) lies in the chest or feet, we can pretend that these n c+f points lie on a single "line."
Focusing on the first summand in the expression above, the simulator can compute each of the two probabilities in this term efficiently. First, the simulator computes the number of integers in J(a i , b i ); denoting this number by j i , P r[x ∈ J(a i , b i )] is simply j i / N/2 . Next, for the second probability, suppose that n c+f + n l is the approximation used in Step 4 of Vallée's algorithm derived from her lower bounds (namely,
) for the legs, and 
. In a similar fashion, the simulator can compute the necessary probabilities for I(a i+1 , b i+1 ), thereby obtaining a perfectly uniform drawing algorithm.
Vallée was presumably content with finding a quasi-uniform drawing algorithm, since a uniform algorithm would not have improved her result of a provable exp( (4/3) log n log log n)-time factoring algorithm by a significant amount. However, as described below, our uniform drawing algorithm has a significant practical impact on Coron's partial-domain hash variant of Rabin's signature scheme.
Improving Coron's Results for Rabin-PDH
Coron [16] provided a random-oracle security proof for a partial-domain hash Rabin signature scheme (Rabin-PDH), in which the signature x is a modular square root (up to a fudge factor) of γ · H(m) + f (m), where H is a partialdomain hash with output space [0, N β ] for 2 3 + ≤ β < 1, f is a possibly constant function, and γ is a constant. In Rabin signing, a common fudge factor is to accept the signature if x 2 ≡ c(γ · H(m) + f (m))(modN ) for any c ∈ {−2, −1, 1, 2}, when N = pq for p ≡ 3(mod8) and q ≡ 7(mod8). In this case, x is an integer in B N,h,h for h = cf (m) and h = h + cγN β if cγ is positive, or for h = h + cγN β and h = cf (m) if cγ is negative. Coron's proof requires that γ be very small in magnitude (e.g., 16 or 256) [16] , so that h − h = |cγN β | is sufficiently small. One reason that Rabin-PDH was an interesting problem for Coron to analyze was that partial-domain hashes were already being used by standardized encoding schemes. For example, ISO 9796-2 defined the encoding µ(m) = 4A 16 m H(m) BC 16 .
As mentioned above, Coron provides a proof of security for Rabin-PDH when h − h is at least ( 2 3 + ) log N bits, but this " " can be quite large in practice. Coron's security proof relies completely on his algorithm for drawing integers from B N,h,h with a distribution whose distance from uniform is at most 16N
−3
This statistical distance must be very small, so that an adversary cannot distinguish a real attack from a simulated attack, in which the simulator uses Coron's drawing algorithm to respond to hash queries. For the statistical distance to be at most 2 −k , we must have that 4 − bits. When k = 80, for example, h − h must be at least 2 3 log N + 364 bits. This means that, for k = 80, Coron's technique does not reduce the minimum output size of the hash function at all, until N is at least 3 · 364 = 1092 bits! We get a better, and much more practical, provable security result by using our perfectly uniform drawing algorithm. In particular, since our algorithm allows us to draw B N,h,h -elements uniformly for h − h ≥ 8N 2/3 , we can prove a reduction from factoring to Rabin-PDH when h − h is only 2 3 log N + 3 bits, over 300 bits less than Coron's result for k = 80! Moreover, the proof of security is tighter than Coron's proof for two reasons: 1) the adversary cannot possibly distinguish the simulated distribution from uniform; and 2) Coron's proof, which adapts his proof for RSA-FDH [15] , does not provide a tight reduction from factoring (cf. Bernstein [6] ).
For completeness, we prove the security of a specific variant of our improved Rabin-PDH, though it should be clear that our drawing algorithm can work with essentially any variant. We pick the one (succintly) described below for its simplicity. Other variants may have advantages; e.g., Bernstein's [6] security reduction is tighter by a small constant, and Bellare and Rogaway [3] describe an encoding scheme that allows (at least partial) recovery of the message being signed.
Let N be the public key, with N = pq for p ≡ 3(mod8) and q ≡ 7(mod8). Let To verify, the recipient checks that either
. This scheme can be easily modified,à la Bernstein [6] , to avoid the computation of Jacobi symbols.
In Appendix A, we prove the following theorem. 
The Compression Algorithms
In the previous section, we reduced the permissible output size of the hash function in Rabin-PDH to about 2 3 log N bits, but Rabin-PDH signatures are still log N bits. In this section, we describe compression algorithms that allow us to compress not only Rabin-PDH signatures, but also Rabin ciphertexts (not to mention aggregate signatures, ring signatures, signcryptions, and so on).
A prerequisite of any compression algorithm is to understand the distribution of what is being compressed. Vallée gives a constructive characterization of the distribution, in Z/N Z, of integers in B N,h,h ; we leverage her characterization to construct a lossless compression algorithms. Roughly speaking, we associate B N,h,h -elements to strings of about log 2 (h − h) bits that specify the B N,h,h -element's Farey interval and its "address" (according to Vallée's rough enumeration) within that interval. For a B-element in a wider Farey interval, we use fewer bits of the bit string to specify the Farey interval and more bits to specify its address; on balance, it evens out.
Our compression algorithms involve two nondeterministic quasi-bijections,
c 2 +log 2 (h −h) (used in the signature schemes) and
(used in the encryption scheme), for small nonnegative constants c 1 and c 2 . These mappings are not actual bijections; we call them "nondeterministic quasi-bijections" since the image of an element under each mapping or its inverse has a small constant cardinality; formally:
For all y ∈ Y, the cardinality of {x
Above, D is an auxiliary set -e.g., it may be used as a source of (a small number of) random dummy bits if one wishes to make π randomized. The purpose of D is simply to make π an actual "mapping," with a single output for a given input (even though for a single x ∈ X there may be multiple outputs). Notice that an actual bijection is a (1, 1, 1, 1) -quasi-bijection.
Roughly speaking, our signature scheme uses θ to compress, without loss, a Rabin-PDH signature (an element of B N,h,h ) to a short bit string. Since the "entropy" of the hash output in Rabin-PDH is about 2 3 log N bits, one may hope that a Rabin-PDH signature can also be this short; in fact, within a few bits, this is precisely the case. To verify the compressed signature, it is decompressed to recover the ordinary Rabin-PDH signature, which is then verified in the normal fashion. Our encryption scheme uses π to map encoded bit strings to integers in B N,h,h , which are then squared to create short ciphertexts. Both θ and π are efficiently computable and efficiently invertible -i.e., it is easy to recover x from π(x, d) or x from θ(x , d) -without any trapdoor information.
Why don't we just replace π with θ −1 ? Indeed, we could if θ were a bijection, but (unfortunately) θ maps each B N,h,h -element to possibly several short strings; if we used θ −1 to map short encoded messages to B N,h,h -elements, multiple plaintexts would correspond to the same ciphertext, which we wish to avoid. Thus, although the only real difference between π and θ −1 is that we reduce the size of π's domain to ensure that it is an injection, we find it convenient to keep the notation separate.
Mapping B-Elements to Short Strings (The θ Quasi-Bijection)
Below, we give one approach to the θ quasi-bijection. Roughly speaking, θ(x , d) re-expresses a B N,h,h -element x according to its Farey interval and its "address" (using Vallée's lattice) within the Farey interval. For example, a "naive" way to re-express x is as (a i , b i , v, l), where (a i , b i ) defines x 's Farey interval, v is the index of the quasi-horizontal line that contains the lattice point associated to x , and l represents the lattice point's position on the line. In this format, x has at most two representations, one corresponding to each Farey interval that contains x ; the only effect of "d" is to pick one of these representations. We describe a different format below that has tighter compression and does not suffer from the parsing problems of the naive approach.
The θ quasi-bijection below maps x ∈ B N,h,h to a short string in [0, h ], where h is a parameter whose value will be calibrated later.
Computing θ(x , d): 
Although not mentioned explicitly in the algorithm description above, Vallée's quasi-enumeration, and the steps that use this quasi-enumeration, depend on the values of h and h (which we assume to be public, and which could be most conveniently be set to 0 and 8N 2/3 ). Shortly, we will calibrate h so that x right − x lef t is larger than (but within a constant of) n c+f + n l . In computing 
Now, we calibrate h to be as small as possible while still allowing the property that at least one bit string in [0, h ] is uniquely associated to each B N,h,helement. We can ensure this property if, for every interval, x right − x lef t ≥ n c+f + n l -i.e., the number of bit strings associated to J(a i , b i ) is at least the number of points in P (a i , b i ).
Since ≥ n c+f + n l , we use an upper bound proven by Vallée [33] :
, then x right − x lef t + 1 > n c+f + n l . As long as the n l estimate is an integer, this implies that x right − x lef t ≥ n c+f + n l , as desired. So, we can set h = 8(h − h). For this value of h , the θ mapping compresses B N,h,h -elements to within 3 bits of the theoretical minimum. The reader can verify that θ outputs an answer for every x (i.e., l 1 ≥ 1) and that θ −1 has exactly one possible output for each x (i.e., l 3 = l 4 = 1).
Mapping Short Strings to B-Elements (The π Quasi-Bijection)
Like θ −1 , the π quasi-bijection maps short strings to B N,h,h -elements. However, we would like π to map short strings (e.g., plaintext strings) into B N,h,h injectively (e.g., to allow correct decryption); thus, the set of short strings is smaller than the set of B N,h,h -elements (rather than the reverse). For that reason, π uses Vallée's lower bounds (unlike θ). Since π is otherwise similar to θ −1 , we relegate a precise description of π to Appendix B.
In terms of performance, all steps of the θ and π quasi-bijections and their inverses are O(log 2 N ), except (possibly) the determination of the Farey interval, which uses continued fractions. However, even the continued fraction step can be computed in O(log6 Compressed Rabin-PDH Signing and Compressed
Rabin-OAEP+ Encryption
In this section, we describe how to use the θ and π quasi-permutations to achieve a 33% reduction in the size of Rabin signatures and Rabin ciphertexts. The signature case is easy to describe. Recall that, in Section 4.2, we described how to construct a Rabin-PDH signature s that satisfies either modN ) ; the other cases can be handled similarly. In this case, we simply set the compressed Rabin-PDH signature to be θ N,h,h (s, d) -i.e., the θ quasi-permutation's compression of s for modulus N and parameters h and h . To verify the compressed Rabin-PDH signature, the verifier simply recovers s from θ N,h,h (s, d), and then verifies s in the normal fashion. Note that anybody can create a compressed Rabin-PDH signature from a (non-compressed) Rabin-PDH signature, and vice versa, without needing trapdoor information -i.e., the compression algorithm is completely separate from the signing process.
The proof of security for compressed Rabin-PDH follows easily from the proof of security for (non-compressed) Rabin-PDH. Specifically, let A be a chosenmessage attack adversary against Compressed Rabin-PDH, and let B be chosenmessage attack adversary against Rabin-PDH that interacts both with a "challenger" and with A. To respond to A's signature query on M , B queries the challenger regarding M , receives back Rabin-PDH signature x , and sends x to A, where x = θ N,h,h (x , d). Eventually, A aborts or sends B a forgery x * on a message M * that it has never queried. B aborts or computes x
N,h,h (x * ) and sends x * to the challenger as its forgery. The encryption case is more complicated, because the compression algorithm cannot be separated from the encryption process. Unfortunately, this facttogether with the fact the encryption scheme is not quite a one-way permutation as required by OAEP+, but rather a quasi-bijection -requires us redo the entire OAEP+ security proof, albeit with relatively minor modifications. At a high level, encryption and decryption proceed as follows:
Encryption: . Although we could use any of a variety of encoding schemes, we prove that Compressed Rabin-OAEP+ has a tight reduction to factoring. The OAEP+ encoding scheme uses three hash functions:
where m, k 0 , k 1 are security parameters. The quantities 2 −k 0 and 2
m , the sender:
In 
Extensions
In the full version of the paper, we describe compressed signcryption, aggregate signature and ring signature schemes, in which we achieve a 33% bandwidth reduction in comparison to Rabin-variants of the schemes in [24] , [23] and [29] . We also note that our compression algorithms can be applied to allow shorter identity-based secret and public keys for the Fiat-Shamir signature scheme and Cocks' identity-based encryption scheme.
, then x right − x lef t − 1 < n c+f + n l . As long as the n l estimate is an integer, this implies that x right − x lef t ≤ n c+f + n l , as desired. To ensure that x right − x lef t is never zero, we want that
128 , where the latter is the diameter of the narrowest Farey interval. So, we can set h to be anything between In the game above, algorithm B plays the part of the challenger, using its its control over the random oracles G, H and H to respond to A's decryption queries. We say that the system is (t, , q D , q G , q H , q H )-secure if no attacker limited to time t, to q D decryption queries, to q G G-queries, to q H H -queries, and to q H H-queries, has advantage more than . Now, we define aspects of the game more precisely.
